Solomon Wolf＃譯視‧傳思: Protests Won’t Undermine Taiwan’s Reputation #服貿退回影響國際聲譽日媒：純為誤導

Protests Won’t Undermine Taiwan’s Reputation
抗議並不會損害台灣國際聲譽

Claims that the Sunflower Movement will hurt Taiwan’s ability to join regional trade pacts are misguided.
宣稱太陽花運動將妨害台灣加入區域貿易協定純為誤導

In fact, states do often renegotiate treaties and usually there is a mechanism for such a procedure embedded in the treaty. The consequences are rarely as grave as is now being claimed. Ireland did not became an international outcast when it failed to approve the Lisbon treaty in a 2008 referendum and the Nice treaty in a 2001 referendum. In both cases, negotiations were opened again, changes were made and both treaties eventually entered into force.

In addition, the argument can be made that other democracies do understand the complexity of the ratification process, especially when it comes to free trade (or free trade-like) agreements. It is also likely that other governments would recognize that agreements with China are different than Taiwan’s dealings with other governments. The United States would hardly stop promoting Taiwan’s Trans-Pacific Partnership membership just because Taipei failed to ratify the CSSTA with China, nor would the failure to ratify the treaty deter Japan from entering into negotiations with Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan’s deals with China are not a reliable benchmark for measuring Taiwan’s reputation. It is hard to think that Taiwan’s partners are not aware of this.

Naturally, Beijing would hardly be pleased if CSSTA were ratified with some major changes. Likewise, it is certainly not pleased by the emergence of a civic movement that crosses party lines and aspires to hold the government accountable. This is especially true because Taiwan’s movement appears to be seen as a model in the increasingly restive Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which Beijing is already struggling to control. If (and only if) the Sunflower Movement succeeds in pushing CSSTA back to the negotiation table, Beijing will face a certain dilemma: if it appears to retaliate, it will only confirm that protesters were right to suspect sinister intentions. Moreover, any future arrangement between Taipei and Beijing will be under very close public scrutiny. Maybe it is, after all, a better option for Ma (and Beijing) to appease public opposition and return to the negotiation table.

事實上，國家之間針對條約重新談判的情形經常發生，且條約中通常含有相關機制規範此程序。所造成的後果也很少如其現在宣稱的如此嚴重。愛爾蘭於2001年的及2008年的公民投票中依序否決了尼斯條約、里斯本條約(註1、2)的簽署，均未因此遭受國際間的排擠。在這兩起案例中，談判皆重新展開，條款重新修訂，兩條約最終仍合法生效。

此外，該說法還有另一項爭議。其他民主國家應能了解條約批准過程的複雜性，尤其當牽涉到簽署自由貿易協定(或類似)。其他國家政府也很可能辨別得出，台灣與中國的協議和他們之間的並不相同；美國不會僅僅因為台灣未能批准兩岸服務貿易協議，便放棄支持台灣加入跨太平洋夥伴協定(TPP)，日本亦不會因此停止對台協商。換言之，台灣和中國的協議對於台灣的信譽並不是可靠的衡量標準，很難想像台灣的邦交國不會意識到這點。

當然，若服貿經部分重大修正而後批准，北京當局不可能為此感到高興。同樣地，對於一項民間運動的出現，跨越了黨派界限，並渴望向政府追究責任，其亦肯定大感不悅。特別是在台灣學運似乎被日益動盪的香港特別行政區視為民主典範，而北京對香港已努力加強掌控之時。如果（且唯有）太陽花學運成功將服貿推回談判桌，北京將必然面臨進退兩難的困境：若採取報復手段，只會證實抗爭者懷疑其圖謀不軌是正確的。並且，未來兩岸之間任何協議都將接受民眾嚴密的審查。也許對於馬總統（或北京當局）而言，較佳選擇仍舊是安撫大眾的反彈並返回談判桌。

註：

尼斯條約（Treaty of Nice），全稱修改歐洲聯盟條約、建立歐洲各共同體諸條約和某些附件的尼斯條約（Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts），為歐盟歷史上的一個重要條約。2001年2月26日，歐盟會員國領導人正式簽署尼斯條約。2003年2月1日，尼斯條約正式施行。主要內容有，規定歐盟委員會委員數須少於２７名；在歐盟理事會表決票數分配上，規定了按成員國人口數目分配表決票數的基本原則，此外擴大了「有效多數制」的應用範圍，以提供歐盟決策效率。
里斯本條約，又稱改革條約，是歐盟用以取代《歐盟憲法條約》的條約。里斯本條約已經在2007年12月13日為所有歐盟成員國簽署，並於2009年12月1日正式生效。里斯本條約旨在調整當前極需變革的歐盟在全球的角色、人權保障、歐盟決策機構效率，並針對全球氣候暖化、天然能源等政策，以提高歐盟全球競爭力和影響力。